

# **Challenges to Overcome Global Energy Trilemma and Its Implication to Malaysia (Based on IEEJ Outlook 2020)**

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# Energy is indispensable for human beings

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- **Energy is essential goods for human life, economic activity and national security**
  
- **It is critically important to provide energy**
  - **in a stable manner;**
  - **at affordable prices;**
  - **in an environmentally sustainable manner**
  
- **Pursuit of energy security, environment protection and economic efficiency is needed**
  
- **But the 3Es often face trade-off: Trilemma**

# Emerging global energy landscape

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- **Volatile crude oil price**
- **Impacts of US “Shale Revolution”**
- **Asia as a gravity center of world energy demand**
- **Energy Geopolitics revisited**
- **Climate change and air pollution as emerging risks**
- **Expectation for advanced and innovative technology**
- **Complicated roles played by market, government and technology**

# Asia's Challenges for "3E"

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## <Energy Security>

- **Rising import dependence and energy security**
  - High oil import dependence. Gas import dependence rising
  - High Middle East dependence, Sea-lane dependence


## <Environment Protection>

- **High coal dependence and environment loads**
  - Challenges for both climate change and pollution problems

## <Economic Efficiency>


- **Need for energy market reform**
  - Japan leads the way. Reform for both energy market and NOCs

# Instability in the Middle East




Source: Prepared by IEEJ

# Asia, heavily dependent on coal



Source: Prepared from "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019"

# Asian countries, diversified energy position



Source: Prepared from "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018"

# Environmental challenges in Asia

- *Growing energy/power demand*
- *Climate change and air pollution*

## NDC under Paris Agreement

Party	Date of submission	Target type	Reduction target	Base year	Target year	Coverage
EU	Mar 6 2015	Absolute emissions	40%	1990	2030	GHG
United States	Mar 31 2015	Absolute emissions	26~28%	2005	2025	GHG including LULUCF
Russia	Apr 1 2015	Absolute emissions	25~30%	1990	2030	GHG
China	Jun 30 2015	GDP intensity	60~65% Total emission peak out before 2030	2005	2030	CO <sub>2</sub>
Japan	Jul 17 2015	Absolute emissions	26%	2013	2030	GHG
Indonesia	Sep 24 2015	Reduction from BAU	29%	BAU	2030	GHG
Brazil	Sep 30 2015	Absolute emissions	37% (43% for 2030)	2005	2025	GHG
India	Oct 1 2015	GDP intensity	33~35%	2005	2030	GHG

## Air pollution in China





# What actually done to reform market?

## ■ Privatization (if applicable)

- State dominant companies to be exposed to market forces
- “Principal-Agent theory”

## ■ Deregulation

- Introduction of competition (power generation, retail)
- Creation of wholesale (spot) market
- Unbundling
- Remove tariff/profit control
- Regulator to check/monitor competition situation
- Etc.

## ■ Impact

- Market mechanism starts to function
- Pricing principle: “Full-cost pricing (cost-pass-on)” to “Market driven”

# Liberalized market and “Energy Mix”

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
- **Liberalization tends to lead to cost minimization**
- **Investment in “Zero-emission” power generation may not be regarded as “cost minimum”**
- **New mechanism required to address the challenges**
  - **UK: Introduction of “FIT/CFD”**
  - **US (states level): Introduction of “ZEC”**
  - **US considers to support “baseload power”**

# Basic scenarios in IEEJ Outlook

	Reference Scenario	Advanced Technologies Scenario
	<p><b>Reflects past trends with technology progress</b> and current energy policies, without any aggressive policies for low-carbon measures.</p>	<p><b>Assumes introduction of powerful policies</b> to address energy security and climate change issues with the utmost penetration of low-carbon technologies.</p>
Social-economy structure	Stable growth led by developing economies despite slower population growth. Rapid diffusion of energy consuming appliances and vehicles due to higher income.	
International energy price	<p>Oil supply cost increases along with demand growth.  <b>Gas</b> price convergences among Europe, N. America and Asia markets.  <b>Coal</b> keeps unchanged with today's level.</p> <p>[LNG in Asia] Higher/lower price cases</p>	Slower price increase due to lower demand growth (coal price decreases).
Energy policies	Gradual reinforcement of low-carbon policies with past pace.	Further reinforcement of domestic policies along with international collaboration.
Energy technologies	Improving efficiency and declining cost of existing technology with past pace.	Further declining cost of existing and promising technology.


# Per capita demand still low in developing economy

## ◆ Final energy demand




## ◆ Energy demand per capita

### Emerging and developing economies



### Advanced Economies




Global final energy demand increases by 30% by 2050 while advanced economies reduce demand.

In emerging and developing economies, demand per capita remains under half of advanced economies even in 2050.


Electricity demand continues to increase, and electrification rate rises in final energy demand.

# World continues to depend on fossil fuels

## ◆ Primary energy demand



## ◆ Change in energy demand (2017-2050)




Natural gas increases by 1.7 times especially in the power sector, becoming a second-position energy.

Coal hits a peak at 2040 and oil remains the most important energy.

Renewables grow rapidly but their share of primary demand mix increase only to 16% from 14%. Lessing dependency on fossil fuels progresses slowly.

# Demand overwhelms supply in Asia

## ❖ Change in energy supply / demand by region (2017-2050)




Over 60% of global demand growth comes from Asia. Meanwhile its energy supply cannot catch up, resulting in dropping energy self sufficiency from 72% to 61%.

North America and the Middle East increase surplus export capacity and enlarge their presences as energy suppliers.

# Emerging Asia sees rising dependence on ME

## ❖ Share of Middle East oil in demand by region




Developing Asia increases dependence on Middle East oil and mitigating risk of supply disruption remains one of the priority issues.


Meanwhile, North America and Advanced Europe reduce the dependence rapidly but would be affected by higher oil price when emergency due to higher dependence at the global level.

# VRE capacity surpass peak demand

## ❖ Power mix and CO<sub>2</sub> intensity



## ❖ Ratio of capacity to peak demand (2050, Advanced Tech.)




Zero-emission power generation (renewables, nuclear and fossil thermal with CCS) dominates 80% of power generation mix in the Advanced Technologies Scenario.

Generation capacity of variable renewable energy (VRE), such as solar PV and wind, exceeds peak electricity demand. Some regions need system stability measures, such as battery storage.




# ATS sees large reduction, 2°C goal still far

## ◆ Primary energy demand



\*REF: Reference Scenario, ATS: Advanced Technologies Scenario

## ◆ Energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions



\*1: Refer to "IEEJ Outlook 2018"

\*2: Emissions path reflected "RCP 2.6" in the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

In the Advanced Technologies Scenario, dependence on fossil fuels drops to 70%, still high level.

Energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions peak at the middle of 2020s and decrease by 23% vs. 2017 in 2050.

To keep temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius, additional programs and innovative technologies are required.

# Rule for ultra long-term: Minimize the total cost

## ❖ Mitigation+Adaptation+Damage=Total Cost

### Mitigation

- Typical measures are GHG emissions reduction via energy efficiency and non-fossil energy use.
- Includes reduction of GHG release to the atmosphere via CCS
- These measures **mitigate** climate change.


### Adaptation

- Temperature rise may cause sea-level rise, agricultural crop drought, disease pandemic, etc.
- **Adaptation** includes counter measures such as building banks/reservoir, agricultural research and disease preventive actions.

### Damage

If mitigation and adaptation cannot reduce the climate change effects enough to stop sea-level rise, draught and pandemics, **damage** will take place.

## ❖ Illustration of Total Cost for Each Path




Without measures against climate change, the mitigation cost is small, while the adaptation and damage costs become substantial. Aggressive mitigation measures on the other hand, would reduce the adaptation and damage costs but the mitigation costs would be notably colossal.

The climate change issue is a long-term challenge influencing vast areas over many generations. As such, and from a sustainability point of view, the combination (or the mix) of different approaches to reduce the total cost of mitigation, adaptation and damage is important.

# Cost-benefit analysis for "2°C target" (IEEJ Outlook 2018)

- ❖ GHG Emissions
- ❖ GHG Concentrations (incl. aerosol etc.)
- ❖ Temperature Rise (vs. 1850-1900)
- ❖ Total Cost (cumulative present value\*)



"2° C Minimizing Cost", for example, is a path that minimizes total cost under the condition of 2° C temperature rise in 2150. Its total cost is 20% higher than "Minimizing Cost" without the temperature limit, but still 50% lower than "Having Emissions". GHG emissions decrease by 30% in 2050 and needs almost zero-emissions after 2100. Temperature rises to slightly above 2° C by 2100 and then declines to 2° C.

\*Emissions path reflected "RCP 2.6" in the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Source: "IEEJ Outlook 2020" (IEEJ, October 2019)

# Challenges for total cost minimum analysis

## 1) Is the damage function accurate?

- Estimation of the damages caused by climate change involves great uncertainties. Although research is progressing around the world, sufficient knowledge has not been accumulated.\*<sup>1</sup>。
- It is important to refine the damage function (relationship between temperature rise and damage value) based on the latest scientific knowledge.

\*1: Most integrated assessment models do not cover all types of damages, and do not consider the interaction between them. Critics say that in many cases the estimated damages for relatively low temperatures (temperature rise of about 1 to 3 °C) for Europe and the United States are applied to other regions and to higher temperatures, possibly resulting in considerable underestimation.

## 2) Modeling tipping elements

- If the progress of an event exceeds the critical point, the automatic absorption of GHG by the Earth system will stop functioning, and the change may be accelerated.
- For example, as Siberian permafrost melting progresses due to global warming, underground methane and CO<sub>2</sub> are released into the atmosphere. The release itself contributes to global warming, further thawing the frozen soil.
- They point out that there is a risk of shifting to a different equilibrium state, for example, "Hothouse Earth" where the temperature is higher by several degrees or more than before as a result.

## 3) Other theoretical issues


- Issues related to long-term discount rates, "fat tails"<sup>\*2</sup>, etc.
- Discussions continue, and no consensus has been found among many researchers at present.

\*2: It has been pointed out that the tail of the probability distribution of the damage by climate change may be thick (i.e. higher probability of occurrence than the normal distribution).

Source: "IEEJ Outlook 2020" (IEEJ, October 2019)

# Examples of tipping elements

1. Arctic summer sea ice: decrease in areal extent-----  
- Decreased albedo, amplified warming
2. Greenland ice sheet: decrease in ice volume-----  
- Decreased albedo, sea level rise
3. Boreal forest: decrease in tree fraction-----  
- Greenhouse gas emissions, biome switch
4. West Antarctic ice sheet: decrease in ice volume-----  
-- Decreased albedo, sea level rise
5. Amazon rainforest: decrease in tree fraction-----  
- Greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss
6. Sahara/Sahel and West African monsoon:  
increased carrying capacity---  
Increase in vegetation fraction
7. El Niño southern oscillation: increase in amplitude-----  
-- Drought in Southeast Asia and elsewhere
8. Atlantic meridional overturning circulation:  
decrease in overturning---  
Regional cooling, ITCZ (Intertropical convergence zone)  
shift




\* The deeper red, the more likely to occur.

T. M. Lenton and H. J. Schellnhuber, 2007. Tipping the scales. *Nature Report Climate Change*, 1, 97-98.


Source: "IEEJ Outlook 2020" (IEEJ, October 2019)

# Total cost minimum analysis incorporating tipping elements

## ❖ GHG Emissions (2°C Minimizing Cost)



## ❖ Total cost (cumulative present value\*)




Incorporating the three tipping elements will reduce the amount of energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and increase the total cost. However, since the damage effect occurs over a long period of time, the impact on the results of cost-benefit analysis is not significant.

The tipping elements incorporated into the model: (1) Melting of the Greenland ice sheet, (2) CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> release due to melting of permafrost, (3) Changes in albedo (sunlight reflection) due to decrease in Arctic sea ice

# Expanding Asian gas market

- Natural gas, which has the lowest environmental footprint among fossil fuels, is anticipated to play a bigger role in the future in Asia.
- Though China and India present the largest demand growth, ASEAN is expected to show remarkable growth as well.
- In terms of demand sectors, power generation is the fastest growing. However, LNG cannot avoid competition with coal in the sector.


## ◆ Natural gas demand outlook in Asia by region



J-K-T = Japan, Korea, and Chinese Taipei

Source: IEEJ

## ◆ Natural gas demand outlook in Asia by sector



Source: IEEJ

# Assumption of LNG price in Asia

- **Reference Scenario:** Real LNG import price in Asia maintains present price range, \$10.1/MBtu in 2018.
    - Assume reduction of amount of oil-linked pricing contract or milder slope of oil linkage.
    - Competitiveness of LNG is low in developing Asia under the current price range.
  - **High Price Case:** Oil-linked pricing at an average slope in 2018 in Asia continues until 2050.
    - LNG will lose competitiveness in the power generation sector thus the demand will be slashed.
  - **Low Price Case:** Historically low spot LNG price (average from Jan to Aug 2019) continues until 2050.
    - Requires substantial cost reduction in every aspect of supply chain including liquefaction and shipping.
- ❖ Assumption of LNG price in Asia (\$2018/MBtu)

	2018	2030	2040	2050
<b>Reference Scenario</b>	10.1	10.0	10.2	10.4
<i>Ref. Crude oil price price</i>	<i>\$71.31/bbl</i>	<i>\$95/bbl</i>	<i>\$115/bbl</i>	<i>\$125/bbl</i>
<b>High Price Case</b>	10.1	13.3	16.1	17.5
<b>Low Price Case</b>	10.1	5.4	5.4	5.4


Source: IEEJ

Source: "IEEJ Outlook 2020" (IEEJ, October 2019)



# LNG demand outlook in Asia by case

- **Reference Scenario:** LNG demand in Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei won't increase. Meanwhile, ASEAN and India will see high (CAGR = 4.4-6.2%) demand growth.
- **High Price Case:** will see substantial reduction of new development of gas-fired power plants. LNG demand will stagnate (CAGR = -0.1%).
- **Low Price Case:** will see shifting investment from coal-fired to gas-fired power plants resulting in a higher LNG demand increase (CAGR = 3.3%).



J-K-T = Japan, Korea, and Chinese Taipei

Source: IEEJ

Source: IEEJ Outlook 2020\* (IEEJ, October 2019)

# Action to enhance LNG security

- LNG supply security would become more important when LNG represents larger part of energy supply.


## ❖ Actions to enhance LNG supply security

Existing action	<b>Diversify supply sources and/or routes</b> Import from other sources when a source is disrupted.
	<b>Reduce energy demand by energy efficiency</b> Reduce import requirement and decrease risks.
	<b>Strong tie with suppliers under long-term contracts</b> Establish a strong tie with suppliers to ensure LNG supply.
Possible	<b>Create a flexible global LNG market</b> Import necessary volumes of LNG in time from the flexible global market.
	<b>Cooperation with other gas markets</b> Construct a mechanism to balance LNG supply-demand in cooperation markets, e.g. China, EU, US.

Source: IEEJ

Source: "IEEJ Outlook 2020" (IEEJ, October 2019)

# More Volumes Are Sold Short Term




(Source) Hiroshi Hashimoto (IEEJ), "LNG Market and Flexibility Developments", April 18, 2019

# Possibility to utilize flexibility in global LNG market

- Favorable changes for LNG supply security are underway in the global market.
  - Robust building up of new liquefaction capacity
  - Increasing supply and transactions of flexible LNG


## ❖ Exported LNG volumes and excess liquefaction capacity



Excess liquefaction capacity = total liquefaction capacity – idling liquefaction capacity – exported LNG volumes

Source: based on data from GIIGNL

## ❖ LNG export by contract period




The “short-term (contract period 4 years or less)” from 2000 to 2014 including “spot” transactions.

Source: based on data from GIIGNL

# Cooperation with other gas markets



- Some markets, e.g. China, EU, and US, have multiple natural gas supply options. Asia can strengthen LNG supply security by benefiting from flexibility of such markets under their cooperation.
- Is the supply security depending on other countries unstable?
  - Oil market has good examples and records.
  - Important to make energy cooperation as a catalyst to strengthen a regional tie.
    - ❖ **Concept to best utilize flexibility in other gas market**



Source: IEEJ


Source: "IEEJ Outlook 2020" (IEEJ, October 2019)

# Expanding installed capacity of VREs





- Recent trends exhibit rapid expansion of the power generating capacities of **Variable Renewable Energies (VREs)**, such as solar and wind, due to growing concerns over climate change issues and continuous cost declines.
- VREs are expected to continue the rapid expansion in the long-term, although we should anticipate several challenges as stated below.

# System integration cost: A conceptual illustration



- If the LCOE of VRE is smaller than that of conventional power sources, the “traditional” power generation cost, which represents the costs proportional to the LCOEs, shown as  $C_{conv} + C_{VRE}$  in the above figure, declines with increasing share of VRE.
- However, high penetration of VRE requires additional cost related to the necessity of power storage, VRE output curtailment, and grid extension, etc., known as **system integration costs**, indicated by  $C_{INT}$  as illustrated above.

# High penetration of renewables in Europe: VRE 40%





- Renewable energy resources are unevenly distributed also in Europe. Hydropower is utilized largely in Scandinavian countries, while wind power is abundant in UK and in Spain. Italy can take advantage of high solar irradiation.
- The total system cost moderately increases as VRE share rises. In comparison with ASEAN, the optimal share of VRE is higher due to higher costs of conventional technologies, while the effects of carbon prices are smaller because of low carbon intensities.



# Integration cost with high shares of VRE: ASEAN

Without grid interconnection Hydropower share: 11%

With grid interconnection Hydropower share: 22%



- Integration costs increase along with higher shares of VRE, although the rise can somewhat be mitigated if grid interconnection is implemented, due to efficient use of hydropower potentials that are distributed unevenly across regions.
- **Strong policy measures need to be implemented** to cover the cost increases with higher shares of VRE.

# Challenges related to higher penetration of VRE

## 1. “Cannibalization” effect: Decline in market values

Once VRE power generating facilities are deployed, they produce electricity with very small marginal costs. This results in very low wholesale electricity prices, which undermines the “values” of the VRE facilities.


## 2. Supply disruption due to extreme weather conditions

VRE outputs, as well as hydropower outputs, vary significantly depending on meteorological conditions in the short-, mid- and long-term.


The risk of supply disruption due to long-term fluctuations with extreme weather conditions is one of the major challenges with very high shares of renewable energies.

# Declines in market values of VRE: Actual data for the period from Jan. to Jul. 2019

## Germany and adjacent areas



## UK and adjacent areas



Source: Entso-E Transparency Platform

- Historical data exhibit low electricity prices with large VRE outputs.
- The prices can take negative values in Germany, when the VRE share exceeds 80%.

# No “Silver Bullet” energy option

## ■ Oil

- Convenience, competitiveness in transport, etc.
- Middle East dependence, CO2 emission, etc.

## ■ Gas

- Clean fuel, supply stability, etc.
- Price competitiveness, etc.

## ■ Coal

- Supply stability, price competitiveness
- CO2 emission, air pollution, etc.

## ■ Renewable energy

- Domestic energy, CO2 free, etc.
- Higher costs, supply intermittency, etc.

## ■ Nuclear

- Quasi domestic energy, CO2 free, baseload power
- Safety concern, PA, etc.

## ■ Energy saving/efficiency

- Contribution to 3 E+S
- Economic burden in case of excessive push for saving

# Reference material

# Examples of technology assumptions

	2017	2050		Assumptions for Advanced Technologies Scenario
		Reference	Advanced Technologies	

## Improving energy efficiency


Industry	Intensity in steel industry (ktoe/kt)	0.284	0.250	0.220	100% penetration of Best Available Technology by 2050.
	Intensity in non-metallic minerals industry	0.092	0.066	0.058	
Transport	Electrified vehicle share in passenger car sales	3%	56%	86%	Cost reduction of electrified vehicles. Promotion measures including fuel supply infrastructure. *electrified vehicle includes hybrid vehicle, plug-in hybrid vehicle, electric vehicle and fuel-cell vehicle
	Average fuel efficiency in new passenger car (km/L)	14.1	23.9	33.8	
Buildings	Residential total efficiency (Y2017=100)	100	154	188	Efficiency improvement at twice the speed for newly installed appliance, equipment and insulation. Electrification in space heating, water heater and cooking (clean cooking in developing regions).
	Commercial total efficiency	100	186	220	
Power	Thermal generation efficiency (Power transmission end)	38%	46%	47%	Financial scheme for initial investment in high-efficient thermal power plant.

## Penetrating low-carbon technology


Biofuels for transport (Mtoe)	84	128	253	Development of next generation biofuel with cost reduction. Relating to agricultural policy in developing regions.
Nuclear power generation capacity (GW)	409	480	717	Appropriate price in wholesale electricity market. Framework for financing initial investment in developing regions.
Wind power generation capacity (GW)	515	1,810	3,065	Further reduction of generation cost. Cost reduction of grid stabilization technology.
Solar PV power generation capacity	386	2,954	4,434	Efficient operation of power system.
Thermal power generation capacity with CCS (GW)	0	0	1,270	Installing CCS after 2030 (regions which have storage potential except for aquifer).
Zero-emission generation ratio (incl. CCS)	35%	41%	79%	Efficient operation of power system including international power grid.

# Comparison with IEEJ Outlook 2019

## ❖ Reference Scenario







## ❖ Advanced Technologies Scenario





\* Primary energy demand  
 Solid lines: IEEJ Outlook 2020  
 Dotted lines: IEEJ Outlook 2019

# Comparison with other outlooks (1)





# Comparison with other outlooks (2)



### Source

#### IEEJ "IEEJ Outlook 2020", Oct. 2019

- REF: Reference Scenario
- ATS: Advanced Technologies Scenario
- LNP: Low Price Case
- HNP: High Price Case

#### IEA "World Energy Outlook 2018", Nov. 2018

- CPS: Current Policies Scenario
- NPS: New Policies Scenario
- SDS: Sustainable Development Scenario

#### BP "BP Energy Outlook 2019", Feb. 2019

- ET: Evolving transition
- RT: Rapid transition demand
- ME: More energy demand

#### DNV GL "Energy Transition Outlook 2019", Sep. 2019

- Base: Base Scenario

#### US EIA "International Energy Outlook 2019", Sep. 2019

- REF: Reference Scenario

#### OPEC "World Oil Outlook 2040", Oct. 2018

- REF: Reference Scenario

#### Shell "Shell Scenarios", May 2018

- SKY: Sky Scenario


#### ExxonMobil "Outlook for Energy", Aug. 2019

# Innovative Technology for ultra long-term

Technologies		Description	Challenges
Technologies to reduce CO <sub>2</sub> emissions	Next Generation Nuclear Reactors	Fourth-generation nuclear reactors such as ultra-high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR) and fast reactors, and small- and medium-sized reactors are now being developed internationally.	Expansion of R&D support for next generation reactors
	Nuclear fusion reactor	Technology to extract energy just like the sun by nuclear fusion of small mass number such as hydrogen. Deuterium as fuel exists abundantly and universally. Spent nuclear fuel as high-level radioactive waste is not produced.	Technologies for continuously nuclear fusion and confining them in a certain space, energy balance, cost reduction, financing for large-scale development and establishment of international cooperation system, etc.
	Space Photovoltaic Satellite (SPS)	Technologies for solar PV power generation in space where sunlight rings abundantly above than on the ground and transmitting generated electricity to the earth wirelessly via microwave, etc.	Establishment of wireless energy transfer technology, reduction of cost of carrying construction materials to space, etc.
Technologies to sequesterate CO <sub>2</sub> or to remove CO <sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere	<b>Hydrogen production and usage</b>	Production of <b>carbon-free hydrogen</b> by steam reforming of fossil fuels and by CCS implementation of CO <sub>2</sub> generated.	Cost reduction of hydrogen production ( <b>fossil and RE basis</b> ), efficiency improvement, infrastructure development ( <b>#1&amp;2 Hydrogen Energy Ministerial Meeting/Tokyo Statement</b> ), etc.
	CO <sub>2</sub> sequestration and usage ( <b>carbon recycling</b> )	Produce carbon compounds to be chemical raw materials, etc. using CO <sub>2</sub> as feedstocks by electrochemical method, photochemical method, biochemical method, or thermochemical method. <b>CO<sub>2</sub> can be removed from the atmosphere.</b>	Dramatic improvement in quantity and efficiency, etc. ( <b>International Conference on Carbon Recycling</b> ).
	Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)	Absorption of carbon from the atmosphere by photosynthesis with biological process and CCS.	It requires large-scale land and may affect land area available for the production of food etc.

# Example of attempts to refine the damage function

## Spatial distribution of projected damages




**Fig. 2. Spatial distributions of projected damages.** County-level median values for average 2080 to 2099 RCP8.5 impacts. Impacts are changes relative to counterfactual “no additional climate change” trajectories. Color indicates magnitude of impact in median projection; outline color indicates level of agreement across projections (thin white outline, inner 66% of projections disagree in sign; no outline,  $\geq 83\%$  of projections agree in sign; black outline,  $\geq 95\%$  agree in sign; thick white outline, state borders; maps without outlines shown in fig. S2). Negative damages indicate economic gains. (A) Percent change in yields, area-weighted

average for maize, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. (B) Change in all-cause mortality rates, across all age groups. (C) Change in electricity demand. (D) Change in labor supply of full-time-equivalent workers for low-risk jobs where workers are minimally exposed to outdoor temperature. (E) Same as (D), except for high-risk jobs where workers are heavily exposed to outdoor temperatures. (F) Change in damages from coastal storms. (G) Change in property-crime rates. (H) Change in violent-crime rates. (I) Median total direct economic damage across all sectors [(A) to (H)].

## Total damage (as a percentage of GDP)

About 2 to 3% at 4 °C  
and about 10 to 11% at 8 °C



- The efforts to refine the damage function are being promoted in the United States, although the sophisticated results do not always differ significantly from previous estimations.

Hsiang et al., 2017. Estimating economic damage from climate change in the United States. *Science*, 356, 1362-1369.

Source: “IEEJ Outlook 2020” (IEEJ, October 2019)

# Estimation of integrated costs: Cases of Europe and ASEAN

## Methodology

- Simulates electricity supply and demand for 2050 with hourly time resolution (24 hours×365 days = 8,760 time slices) based on historical data for 2014.
- Calculates supply-demand balances for the year, also estimating the required investments, using the Linear Programming method.
- Considers the costs of power storage systems, interregional transmission lines, VRE output curtailment, declines in the load factors of conventional power generating facilities, and the load frequency control (LFC) constraints.
- Possibly underestimates the total costs, without some elements being considered explicitly: Increases in the start and stop numbers of thermal facilities, declines in the efficiencies due to partial load operation, and the inertia of the power systems.
- Considers batteries and pumped hydro power generation as electricity storage systems, additionally estimating the use of hydrogen storage.

**Batteries:** Assumes that the average cost declines to USD 80/kWh by 2050.

**Hydrogen storage:** Although the costs of storage facilities (hydrogen tanks) are much cheaper than batteries at USD 13/kWh, additional expenses are required for electrolysis, etc.

## Regional divisions

- Europe: 6 subregions, ASEAN: 10 countries

# Breakdown of the integration cost

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## 1. Balancing cost

- Costs related to the uncertainty of power generation due to unforeseen plant outages or forecasting errors.

## 2. Grid-related cost

- Costs related to locational constraints, which can be further divided into two categories: grid reinforcement costs and connection costs.

## 3. Profile cost

- Costs related to the temporal variability of power generation,

### 3-1. Adequacy cost / Backup cost

### 3-2. Overproduction cost

### 3-3. Full-load hour reduction

### 3-4. Flexibility effect

Sources: Ueckerdt F. et al., 2013. System LCOE: What are the costs of variable renewables?, *Energy*, 63, pp.61-75.  
OECD/NEA, 2018. *The full costs of electricity provision*.


# Challenges for high penetration of VRE (1)

## Cannibalization effect

◎ With large deployment of solar PV power generating facilities, ...

→ Massive electricity is supplied with very low marginal costs, during the daytime on a sunny day.

→ Wholesale electricity prices take very low values during those hours.



Under such situations, ....

### Solar PV power facilities:

- Generate electricity only during low-price hours.
- **“Market values” of solar power facilities decline significantly** in line with solar power deployment.
- If the “value” falls below the LCOE, further deployment of solar PV facilities becomes difficult.

### Conventional power facilities:


- Generate electricity during higher price hours as well.
- Limited declines in market values.
- However, **recovering the initial costs becomes more difficult** due to lower wholesale market prices.

- Similar situations take place, although in a somewhat milder manner, also for large deployment of wind power facilities.

# Challenges for high penetration of VRE (2)

## “Windless” periods

Vertical axis:

Demand and power generation  
GW

▪ **windless (and sunless) periods**, also known as **dark solariums**, in which wind and solar power output is exceptionally small, can take place once or twice in a year. The above figure illustrates an extreme case with zero thermal power generation during these periods, in which massive power discharge is required to meet the demand.

▪ To achieve very high shares of VRE, it would be required to assess the largest risks related to supply disruptions during windless periods, using multiannual meteorological data, and to implement energy storage capacities large enough to meet electricity demands.